More particularly is this my feeling with regard to (I hate the word) women.
We know beforehand all they can teach us: yet we are obliged to learn it
directly from them.

Matthew Arnold¹

Woman is, strictly speaking, nearer to the ideal human nature than man . . .

Wilhelm von Humboldt

SCANNING THE STATE OF THE QUESTION IN HIS CRITIQUE OF THE "traditional view" on the
Victorian origins of the twentieth-century welfare state, Robert F. Haggard reluctantly acknowl-
edges as some of the “less often mentioned” “founders” “a number of prominent socialists (Wil-
liam Morris and Stewart Headlam), writers (John Ruskin, Charles Dickens, and Matthew
Arnold), and reformers (Octavia Hill and Josephine Butler)” but promptly adds that “the impact
these individuals had on the ideology of the Welfare State was . . . limited, indirect, and, in sev-

¹ The epigraphs for this article are drawn from Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough, September 29, 1848, in The Letters of
Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough, ed. and intro. Howard Foster Lowry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 93; and
eral cases, wholly unintentional.” Leaving “socialists” and “reformers” aside, could the influence of “writers” ever be anything other than limited, indirect, and, in a qualified sense, unintentional?

Matthew Arnold’s critical writings are a sustained invitation to pursue this question of authorial agency in civic engineering. As the title of his foundational 1864 tract “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” indicates, it was a question he explicitly posed himself. Indeed, the very act of writing criticism was Arnold’s response to what he diagnosed as a crisis of agency in the exercise of poetry—an exercise he himself had pretty much abandoned by 1860. Arnold’s turn to critical prose was a deliberate move in a quest for public discursive agency. His purpose was to re-create conditions for the optimal impact of literature on human conduct in ways appropriate to modern life. The task of criticism is “to create a current of true and fresh ideas” in hopes of transforming the barren “wilderness” of modernity into the “promised land” of “progress” and “perfection” where literature and therefore humanity can truly flourish. One such “true and fresh idea” that Arnold felt was sorely needed in mid-Victorian Britain was an adequate notion of community, and arguably his central mission from the 1860s onward was to give an articulate shape to such a notion: to institute a sense of society actively committed to justice and beauty that would overrule divisive self-interest and win universal assent. In his own words, Arnold was in the business of “establishing the State.”

Our concern in this article is to save this enterprise from the dismissal as idle idealism it so richly seems to deserve and to recover it as a consistently critical and acutely self-conscious rhetorical exercise. The critical nature of Arnold’s mission resides in his deliberate avoidance of available models of community such as the family, the parish, and the nation that are no longer adequate to the modern condition of democracy—particularly as regards the organization of education, Arnold’s area of professional expertise as inspector of schools. Its self-consciousness is apparent in his marked engagement with questions of discursive agency—most visibly in his explicit reflections on influence and reception and in his negotiation of authorial role models. Here, too, his strategy is to avoid the readily available by adopting and inventing models of authorial agency that are not founded in the comfortable confidence of English or Anglican identity but belong to, or are displaced toward, alternative, variously eccentric, un-English or European traditions. At the same time, and further compromising the already qualified sense of authorial agency he derives from his models, he espouses a rhetoric of beauty, sentiment, sweetness and light that runs counter to the dominant ethos of masculine mastery over the makable, and courts disabling association with increasingly feminized codes of servile care culture confirming that dominant ethos.

Arnold’s intent is to give “adequate expression” to the notion of the state (C&A, 143), and adequacy is of critical importance here. For it to be adequate, the expression must accurately articulate the notion or idea it conveys (a nontrivial condition), and it must do this in such a way
that the idea can productively circulate in the public domain. The latter condition primarily involves a narrow understanding of the proper function of rhetoric in terms of pleasing persuasion: rhetoric as a technique to dress up preestablished ideas or notions so that they may command assent. This misses the more radical potential of rhetoric, and indeed of technique, to actually constitute the content it then releases for reproduction, and our thesis throughout is that Arnold’s writing on the state demands to be read along these lines: as an exercise of rhetoric constructing expressions adequate to thoughts that are as yet unavailable. Adequacy in this sense is paradoxically an appropriateness to what has not yet been set as a term for comparison—the evident materialist implication being that technique is constitutive of, rather than convenient to, content.7

In effect, Arnold’s rhetorical enterprise in the service of the state is predicated on principled alienation: it resists the appeal of the familiar and the available both in the shape of the idea it pursues and in the actual practice of that pursuit. We propose to read the scripts of this double resistance by reviewing Arnold’s invention of Wilhelm von Humboldt as a precursor soul mate, by tracing the distinctive features of his tropes of state (particularly as these affect his educational polemics) and by probing his curious evasiveness on matters of gender. Our aim is to show how his resistance to the familiar may have contributed to, but has also been overcome by, the actually existing welfare state and to suggest that thought of the state today has every reason to revisit a body of writing that tried to imagine a total justice engine finally fully running on language rather than blood.

“BUT CONTRIBUTIONS”

Any attempt to come to terms with Arnold’s contribution to the emergence of the welfare state must reflect on the very possibility conditions of such a contribution—especially since what is often considered his most influential work, Culture and Anarchy, is shot through with stylishly self-conscious worries and arresting speculations responding precisely to the question of literature’s contribution to the historical dynamics of political society. “All writings,” Arnold writes, “must inevitably, from the very nature of things, be but contributions to human thought and human development, which extend wider than they do” (C&A, 143). As contributions, all writings are dependent on their author’s “power to give . . . adequate definition and expression” (C&A, 143) to whatever it is they seek to contribute. And as writings, these contributions require actual reading, but as is evident from “the dealings of Puritanism with the writings of St. Paul” (C&A, 143), not to mention the dealings of the Daily Telegraph with the writings of Matthew “Elegant Jeremiah” Arnold, that can hardly be taken for granted.8

Conditioned by often inadequate powers of expression and understanding, the real effect of written work incalculably determines the wider indeterminacies of history. As an instance of this effect, Arnold suggests the putative influence of the Oxford movement on “the new and more democratic force” (C&A, 74) displacing mid-Victorian middle-class liberalism in the late 1860s. In its heyday, the movement’s Tracts for the Times did not succeed in warding off the force of liberalism: “The Oxford movement was broken, it failed; our wrecks are scattered on every shore” (C&A, 73). But on Arnold’s hypothesis, the movement’s force was not spent in this failure: “who

7 Our understanding of rhetoric is indebted to Paul de Man, especially his seminal essay “The Epistemology of Metaphor,” Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978): 13–36, which also engages with tropes of the state.
8 Arnold frequently voices his exasperation at what is made of him in the press; the “Elegant Jeremiah” jibe is a case in point; see C&A, 56. For a recent succinct account of Arnold’s more general views on interpretation in the context of Victorian hermeneutics, see Suzy Anger, Victorian Interpretation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 44–46.
will estimate how much the currents of feeling created by Dr. Newman’s movement . . . contributed to swell the tide of secret dissatisfaction which has mined the ground under the self-confident liberalism of the last thirty years, and has prepared the way for its sudden collapse and supersession?” (C&A, 74) If John Henry Newman’s indirect contribution to democracy is indeed hard to estimate, it is certainly unlikely to have been intentional. In an 1855 letter to the editor of the Catholic Standard, for instance, he declares that he has “no wish for ‘reforms’; and should be sorry to create in the minds of your readers any sentiment favorable either to democracy or to absolutism.” Yet despite what Newman may have wished, for Arnold the “currents of feeling” favorable to democracy he imagines issuing from Newman’s movement are the real evidence for the “manner” in which “the sentiment of Oxford for beauty and sweetness conquers” (C&A, 74).

The fate of written “currents” in the wider waters of human history held a particular fascination for Arnold. His commitment to “adequate definition and expression” is typically shadowed by a sense of resignation no less critical for being conventional. Significantly, in “The Function of Criticism,” it is just such a moment of resignation in the writings of Burke (his eminently “un-English” “return upon himself,” “as the French say”) that Arnold singles out “as one of the finest things in English literature, or indeed in any literature.” In his later engagement with the state, Arnold turns to Wilhelm von Humboldt for another version of this turn.

HUMBOLDT’S GIFT

Arnold marshals Humboldt as yet another instance of the contingencies of contribution and the afterlife of writing when he sets his sights on the tendency of English public discourse to reproduce itself in preaching to the converted—or, more accurately in this case, to those who are naturally not for turning. What the English do not need converting to, as it is their “natural leaning,” is “relying on the individual” rather than “act[ing] through the collective nation on the individual” (C&A, 123)—the English, famously, “have not the notion, so familiar on the Continent and to antiquity, of the State,—the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals” (C&A, 83). And English public discourse seems determined to maintain this lack, even turning for wholly superfluous support to Continental antiquities: “In a recent number of the Westminster Review, an able writer . . . has unearthed, I see, for our present needs, an English translation, published some years ago, of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s book, The Sphere and Duties of Government” (C&A, 123). The object of the book, Arnold admits, “is to show that the operation of government ought to be severely limited to what directly and immediately relates to the security of person and property” (C&A,

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123), and Humboldt, he adds, "saw, of course, that, in the end, everything comes to this,—that the individual must act for himself and must be perfect in himself" (C&A, 124). Yet Humboldt "lived in a country, Germany, where people were disposed to act too little for themselves, and to rely too much on the Government" (C&A, 124), unlike the Westminster Review’s “able writer,” who writes “for a people whose dangers lie . . . on the side of their unchecked and unguided individual action, whose dangers none of them lie on the side of an over-reliance on the State,” and who can therefore only ever be “flatter[ed] in their propensities” by quoting Humboldt at them (C&A, 124)—as long as it is the Humboldt who wrote what is now better known as The Limits of State Action,¹¹ not the Humboldt whom Arnold wants to see unearthed:

such was his flexibility, so little was he in bondage to a mere abstract maxim, that he saw very well that for his purpose itself, of enabling the individual to stand perfect on his own foundations and to do without the State, the action of the State would for long, long years be necessary. And soon after he wrote his book on The Sphere and Duties of Government, Wilhelm von Humboldt became Minister of Education in Prussia; and from his ministry all the great reforms which give the control of Prussian education to the State . . . take their origin. This his English reviewer says not a word of. (C&A, 124)

Arnold’s argument is characteristically sinuous and evasive with regard to the predicament it nonetheless performs. For how is Humboldt’s practice as “Minister of Education” different from that of the Westminster Review’s “able writer”? Both, after all, on the terms Arnold himself sets up, confirm their “people” in their propensities—propensities, moreover, that Humboldt’s pre-ministerial writing singularly failed to dislodge. Humboldt’s example, then, again according to the terms of Arnold’s argument, holds some home truths for writers and public servants alike: his writing made no difference in Germany¹² and merely confirms the order of the same in England; his ministry only consolidated German reliance on the state and in England is quite simply ignored. Writing has no purchase on “natural leaning,” and public service merely serves that leaning.

At first sight Humboldt appears a self-evident figure for Arnold to turn to: one of the high priests of Bildung and, as such, a direct progenitor of Arnold’s “Culture,” as well as a prominent servant of state education inspiring Arnold in his day job as inspector of schools. But what Arnold says not a word of (quite apart from the fact that Humboldt, never strictly speaking a minister, served as director of the section for ecclesiastical affairs and education in the Ministry of the Interior for only about eighteen months, leaving his position in 1810; apart also from the fact that Humboldt never published “his book,” written some two decades before his brief stint in educational reform) is how Humboldt’s writing relates to the enterprise for which Arnold seeks to enlist his exemplary support: “establishing the State” (C&A, 101).

Our concern here is not with the way in which Humboldt’s practice as writer and state functionary effectively contributed to the consolidation of the Prussian Bildungsstaat, nor even with

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¹¹ Humboldt’s Ideen zu einem Versuch die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen (Ideas toward an Attempt at Establishing the Limits of State Action), written in 1791–92, was never published during his lifetime, though portions of the manuscript did appear in journals at the time. It was first published as a whole in 1851, with an English translation by Joseph Coulthard (the one “unearthed” in the Westminster Review) following in 1854. Coulthard’s translation was revised as The Limits of State Action by J. W. Burrow, who also provides an excellent introduction, in 1969. This edition is currently available in the Liberty Fund reprint cited above. Coulthard’s original translation (The Sphere and Duties of Government) is available online at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/589.

the actual state of that state in Humboldt’s lifetime, or with what remained of it in Arnold’s. 13
What engages us here, rather, is the manner in which Arnold constructs Humboldt as a precur-
sor for his own practice as writer of “political and social criticism,” as the subtitle of Culture and Anarchy has it, and as government official in the realm of education. Such reconstruction, we ar-
urge, affords us a more precise appreciation of the function of Arnold’s criticism as an exercise of aesthetic ideology, and of the extent to which this exercise affected or failed to affect the “cur-
rents of feeling” eventually feeding into the English ideology of the welfare state.

In Culture and Anarchy, Humboldt appears twice: first as a mere name, together with Schleiermacher, representing the kind of advisers that English governors unwittingly miss (C&A, 118); and then in the passage quoted above, which mentions The Sphere and Duties of Government but refrains from actually reading it. In fact, as R. H. Super suggests, Arnold’s com-
ments on the book and on Humboldt’s aims as educational reformer appear to have been pri-
marily or even exclusively inspired by (or lifted from) a study on Humboldt by Paul-Armand Challemel-Lacour (C&AForg, 435). In Schools and Universities on the Continent, however, published about one year before Culture and Anarchy, Arnold does quote directly from Humboldt, even using him as the supplier of the book’s epigraph: “The thing is not, to let the schools and universities go on in a drowsy and impotent routine; the thing is, to raise the culture of the na-
tion ever higher and higher by their means.” 14

In the course of the report launched under this noble inscription, Arnold credits Humboldt
with having presided over the “great epoch of reform for the higher schools of Prussia” (this time
acknowledging its brevity) and repeats the epigraph in the original German, identifying it as “the
first words of a memorandum [which] might be taken as a motto for his whole administration of
public instruction.” 15 Super indicates that Arnold had been using Ludwig Wiese’s Das höhere Schulwesen in Preussen (Higher Education in Prussia) when drafting his report, including this
passage, but as Humboldt’s biographer Paul R. Sweet points out, the noble motto Arnold copies
from Wiese was not written by Humboldt. 16 The familiar observation, then, that Humboldt sup-
plies the epigraph for important works of two very different Victorian thinkers, Arnold’s Schools
and Universities and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, seems to be based on careless copying. 17

Yet what matters here is not that Arnold got his quotation wrong but that he did not find
anything more right in Humboldt’s actual writings. Bracketing the possibility that he just could
not be bothered to look, the more productive point to be retained is that Humboldt’s writing
simply did not provide what Arnold needed: an adequate expression “capable of meeting the
great want of our present embarrassed times!” —such as, say, a statement to the effect that the
thing is to raise the culture of the nation to the level of the state: “We want an authority, and we
find nothing but jealous classes, checks, and a dead-lock; culture suggests the idea of the State.
We find no basis for a firm State-power in our ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our

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15 Ibid., 209.
16 Sweet, Humboldt, 2:97.
17 See, e.g., the editor’s introduction in Humboldt, Limits, xvii. David Lloyd and Paul Thomas add a curious further twist to this error when they suggest that Humboldt supplied the epigraph for Culture and Anarchy. See David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, Culture and the State (New York: Routledge, 1998), 121.
best self” (C&A, 99). In the ideology of Bildung descended from Humboldt, the state fundamentally remains a necessary transitional arrangement dedicated to its own dissolution once the universal Bildung of all is achieved in a second innocence saving humankind from the alienations of artifice. In Arnold, subtly but decisively different, it is culture, his code for Bildung, that suggests the idea of the state, and the task of culture is then to give adequate expression to this idea, for instance, by describing it as based in “our best self.” Humboldt, as Arnold writes, “saw, of course, that, in the end, everything comes to this,—that the individual must act for himself and must be perfect in himself” (C&A, 124). Yet for Arnold the cardinal feature of the present time, of modernity, is that we never are in the end: the best self is never oneself and only ever figures as the projected basis for the idea with which culture means to manage the predicament of our endlessness, the state.

In the absence of achieved culture, and thus of the properly established state, the individual is left at liberty to “act for himself,” and it is Arnold’s signature twist that he should diagnose this condition of “doing what one’s ordinary self likes” (C&A, 109), this “freedom” or “happiness,” as mere “machinery” considered as a “precious end in [it]sel[f]” (C&A, 64). The ordinary self doing as it likes finds its end in the mere machinery it serves, in itself as a marionette driven by likes and dislikes primarily determined by class disposition proudly claimed as evidence of freedom and happiness. The best self, by contrast, is the object of “curiosity” of “a certain number,” born in any class, who are intent on “seeing things as they are” and are driven by “the love for perfection” (C&A, 109). These, not nearly notoriously enough, are Arnold’s “aliens”: they do not belong in the here and now of the end in itself but are driven by the critical spirit challenged by, and constitutive of, modernity (C&A, 110).18 Arnold’s term is arresting and apparently at odds with the subsequent qualification of the aliens as “persons who are mainly led, not by their class spirit, but by a general humane spirit, by the love of human perfection.” Yet rather than understand this qualification as what it also is, a reassuring rhetorical recuperation, we should entertain reading it as an alienation of the notion of the human itself, including the best self. It is this alienation that conditions humans as never being “in the end” and categorically postpones the time when “everything comes to this—that the individual must act for himself and must be perfect in himself” (C&A, 124). In the mean time of modernity, the state, precisely because it precludes in principle the ready-scripted routines of identity formation, is the structure that sustains and preserves this lack of the end rather than the means to its achievement.

The projection of the fate of the state as a means to an end that would spell its dissolution is a familiar topos in nineteenth-century political thought. It evidently informs idealist master narratives such as Humboldt’s, but it equally supplies Marx’s analysis of class struggle with an eschatological drive. In his account of Victorian liberal theory—particularly Arnold and Mill—Daniel S. Malachuk also proposes to “expos[e] how the state itself in that theory is ultimately but a provisional means to the end of perfection.”19 Yet is there an end to perfection? Malachuk recognizes Arnold’s reservations regarding even the conceptual availability of “perfection” but seeks to spirit them away in an unconvincing account of a supposed “shift” in Arnold’s “understanding of the ambition of the state in the early 1860s—from an adaptation to history to noth-

19 Daniel S. Malachuk, Perfection, the State, and Victorian Liberalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 121.
ing less than perfection of humankind.”  Even on the basis of the evidence Malachuk himself supplies, it is more accurate to say that for Arnold adaptation to history is the perfection of (hu)mankind and that the historical medium of that endless process proper to modernity is the state—emphatically including what Malachuk calls the “machinery” of “didactic pedagogy,” whose persistence in Arnold’s program he rightly recognizes as a distinctive feature.

If in Humboldt the state is a means to an end other than itself—that is, oneself—in Arnold the state means our lack of an end in ourselves other than what is never our own—our best self itself, the seat of the state as an end without end. The ungainly convolutions of this formula are an index of our, and Arnold’s, embarrassment: the one thing needful remains “adequate definition and expression” of “the idea of the State” (C&A, 99, emphasis altered) as an essential supplement to our modern selves rather than a means to our end in our ordinary selves. And this Humboldt does not supply, leaving Arnold to rewrite him as the author of a tract on the limits and eventual end of the state who turned back on himself to become the architect of fully integrated state-controlled Prussian education and who now, importantly, demands recognition as “one of the most beautiful souls that have ever existed” (C&A, 123–24). We will return to this strange figure of a beautiful soul serving state control—for now, let us just underscore that it does not express itself and leaves unwritten the idea of the state as an endless institution in the service of unimaginably more than mere security of person and property. What Humboldt did write about the state, Arnold would rather forget; what he should have written, Arnold still has to invent, in a critical performance of active inheritance similar to the triumphant transmission of Newman’s “currents of feeling [for] beauty and sweetness” into the “force” of democracy (C&A, 74).

TYRANNY AND TOTALITY

Arnold’s writing on the state is haunted by an inchoate idea in search of a compelling catachresis in a universe of discourse saturated with inadequate articulations. The available rhetoric of community draws on nature, the family, the country, the nation, and class:

Every one of us has the idea of country, as a sentiment; hardly any one of us has the idea of the State, as a working power. And why? Because we habitually live in our ordinary selves, which do not carry us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to belong. And we are all afraid of giving the State too much power, because we only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government, and are afraid of that class abusing power to its own purposes. (C&A, 98–99)

What is required is quite strictly and technically an alternative imagination of the state: only when the state can be had as an idea unembodied by the all too recognizable ordinary selves that happen to execute its functions can it become the repository of the power it needs to perform these functions properly. The articulation of this alternative script—in the face of accusations

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20 Ibid., 142–43.

21 Ibid., 149–50. Arnold’s conception of “perfection” as something never quite achieved informs statements like “Not a having and a resting, but a growing and a becoming, is the character of perfection as culture conceives it” (C&A, 62). Admittedly, his further point that in this “it coincides with religion” appears to smuggle in eschatology again—unless of course it robs religion of its last word.

22 Humboldt’s implicit failure to deliver discourse adequate to Arnold’s diagnosis of the modern predicament resembles Goethe’s gradual “irrelevance to Arnold” in the realm of political thought as described in James Simpson, “Arnold and Goethe,” in Matthew Arnold (Writers and Their Background), ed. Kenneth Allott (London: Bell, 1975), 314.
that he is “merely toying with poetry and aesthetics” and producing “cant about culture,” “keeping aloof from the work and hope of a multitude of earnest-hearted men”—is what Arnold conceives as his “contribution in aid of the practical necessities of our time” (C&EA, 55, 99–100). The state Arnold seeks to imagine is a structure of public purposiveness deflecting its citizens’ habitual routines of belonging, and the gamble is that this relative failure of identification will, seemingly paradoxically, generate an increase in trust yielding a proportionate increase in the delegation of power to the state. It is right that this program should appear counterintuitive to the point of perversity: modernity requires new modes of representation. Yet precisely because these new modes are required, responsiveness to attempts to establish them cannot be assumed—as witness the long history of bad reading Arnold has suffered, responding to his attempts at adequate expression by failing to see the point and processing his scripts as what in themselves they really are not.23

If aesthetic ideology can be characterized in general as the productive circulation of psychotechnic tropes of public purposiveness, ostentatiously unaffected by divisive private interests yet simultaneously readily available for private investment,24 the crucial challenge for a discourse like Arnold’s that seeks to imagine a state whose distinctive feature is its irreducible difference from its citizens’ ordinary selves is the construction of a tropology that defers the inevitable identificatory collapse of the public into the private as long as is humanly possible—which, it is probably fair to say, is never likely to be long enough. By way of contrast, Wordsworth’s call, in The Excursion, on “this Imperial Realm” to “teach . . . all the children whom her soil maintains / The rudiments of letters, and inform / The mind with moral and religious truth”25 provides a representative instance of an aesthetic ideologeme that dismisses this challenge by embracing the collapse of the idea of the state into the trope of the family.

—This sacred right is fruitlessly announced,
This universal plea in vain addressed,
To eyes and ears of parents who themselves
Did, in the time of their necessity,
Urge it in vain; and, therefore, like a prayer
That from the humblest floor ascends to heaven,
It mounts to meet the State’s parental ear;
Who, if indeed she own a mother’s heart,
And be not most unfeelingly devoid
Of gratitude to Providence, will grant
The unquestionable good—which, England, safe
From interference of external force,
May grant at leisure; without risk incurred

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23 Malachuk’s Perfection is a powerful recent survey of this history of bad reading; see esp. 55–71. Our approach here is complementary in that it seeks to recover the tropological detail of the conceptualizations of the state whose distorted twentieth-century reception by admirers and detractors alike Malachuk documents. Malachuk claims acute awareness of Arnold’s “sophisticated use of rhetoric” (138) but understands this sophistication solely as embellishment with a view to persuasion, not as a genuinely rhetorical effort at unprecedented inscription.


That what in wisdom for herself she doth,
Others shall e'er be able to undo. (bk. 9, ll. 321–35)

With splendid economy, the limitations of the deprived nuclear family are spirited away in the catachrestic projection of its structure onto the state. The price to be paid for that transaction is the idea of the state itself: its very unfamiliarity demands reading but is routinely domesticated in all-too-familial understanding. It is a price Arnold refuses to pay.26

In “Democracy,” his introduction to the separate publication of his contribution to the 1861 Newcastle Commission’s “Report on Elementary Education,” this refusal is still implicit. “The State—but what is the State? cry many”: “The State is the representative acting-power of the nation.”27 This is not a particularly beautiful or powerful trope—in fact, it is barely a trope, far too close to the prose it proposes to read to receive the recognition and assent rhetoric like Wordsworth’s commands. In A French Eton, or Middle-Class Education and the State, Arnold spells out his resistance to that rhetoric: “Is a citizen’s relation to the State that of a dependent to a parental benefactor? By no means; it is that of a member in a partnership to the whole firm.”28

Whether a firm can manage to remain all that different from a family is another matter—the point here is that Arnold strains for a trope to mark such difference, scrabbling parent into partner to exorcise the pars pro toto routine that is the default setting of the English political imagination. The relation of the citizen to the state is not a relation to a part of the whole state conceived as a body with a head imagining itself as the whole. It is not like the relation of a member of a family to another member representing the family whole as its head. It is properly the relation to an idea that can only be adequately expressed in a principled avoidance of figures articulating relations of parts of a whole to a more privileged part of that whole. The proper relation of the citizen to the state is a relation to the whole of the state.

Elsewhere in A French Eton, Arnold offers a parenthetical aside worrying the logic of synecdoche and totalization still further: “(in this country . . . the parts will always be more likely to tyrannise over the whole than the whole over the parts).”29 The underarticulated script of the tyranny of the whole over the parts is patently a clumsy catachresis struggling to imagine the unthinkable: for to the extent that the state, the firm, or the whole is not subjected to the tyranny of the part, any part, the very notion of tyranny as the literal anthropomorphization and authorization of collective purpose should lose all purchase. In Culture and Anarchy, “tyranny” appears twice: once as a term with which the English ordinary selves name their suspicion of the state (83); once as Arnold’s name for the rule of “our everyday selves” (99). As a term that appears to name both the individual’s suspicion of the state and the state’s suspicion of the individual, “tyranny” deserves closer scrutiny.30

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26 Amanda Anderson offers a compelling account of Arnold’s “inability to imagine reciprocal social relations as a site where one’s own principles might be enacted” (Powers of Distance, 118). While we subscribe to much of Anderson’s analysis, our reading of Arnold’s imagination of the principles of the state suggests this inability partly involves a refusal: the available models of reciprocal social relations tend to erase the difference Arnold is at pains to articulate.


29 Ibid., 309–10.

30 For an instructive account of the complicated history of the term, see Victor Parker, “Tyrannos: The Semantics of a Political Concept from Archilochus to Aristotle,” Hermes: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie 126 (1998): 145–72. The etymology of the term is obscure, but it might have pleased Arnold to learn that “the only reasonably certain cognate of tyrannos yet found
Like monarchy, tyranny is the rule of one, with this specification: that the tyrant, at least in current usage, is “one who seizes upon sovereign power in a state without legal right” (OED). This understanding of the tyrant as “an absolute ruler who seizes power in violation of established precepts” is comparatively recent, as is the negative connotation of the tyrant’s rule as evil. For our purposes, though, the historically unstable distinction between the legitimate autocracy of a king proper and the illegitimate autocracy of a tyrant is a useful device to frame the questions of power and representation Arnold grapples with. The relevant type of tyrant here is a political agent who finds sufficient support in disaffected sections of the polis to seize power, typically from a king whose legal claims to power involve the blood-myth nexus of hereditary rule. Offending established precepts, tyrants represent political division by embodying the interests of factions of the polis and reflecting these as collective purpose: they differ from kings to the extent that their actual use of power is what seals their rule—tyrants are the authors of their own authority; they are naked monarchs, embodying authority without investiture. To return to Arnold’s terms, the tyrant is a part of the whole representing the interests of parts of that whole as the community’s collective purpose. The only thing the tyrant lacks is a precept legitimizing his claim to representation, such as the blood-myth of inheritance, which phantasmally translates the power of the part into the power of the whole. Tyranny is the pure power of the part: it is a limit case of partial political representation offensive precisely because it dispenses with the legitimating myths underpinning alternative modern anthropomorphic imaginations of power.

As naked rule representing partial interests as collective interests, tyranny highlights the plight of party-political practice in postmythical modernity, where legitimate rule can technically be qualified as tyranny sanctioned by a mechanism of representation constitutively marked by partiality and covering its embarrassment with memories of monarchy. What remains unimaginable is the whole exerting power as a whole: tyranny as a trope accurately names that missing image by negation. It is no coincidence, then, that immediately following his diagnosis of the lack of the notion of the state in English thought, Arnold should concede “that this notion is often made instrumental to tyranny” (C&A, 83): the notion of the might of the whole blows a hole in the standard image of political representation; the tyranny trope is an apotropaic catachresis that restores the fabric of the familiar. As an all-purpose demonizing stopgap, tyranny is the anthropomorphic counterpart and precursor of totalitarianism: both figure as names for a failure to properly imagine what Arnold, in the 1869 preface to Culture and Anarchy, calls “totality”—a failure, needless to say, affecting historically post-Victorian regimes of totality at least as much, and with far more disastrous consequences, as it does more “provincial” regimes rejecting the notion of totality in the first place (C&A, 193).

Arnold’s tacit admission, in A French Eton, that the power of the whole must always appear as the power of tyranny is testimony to the unavailability of the radical reinscription of power that is the one thing needful in his diagnosis of modernity. In the absence of such reinscription beyond blood (family) and myth (God), the systematic parentalist partialization of political representation continues to exert its legitimate tyranny over the English imagination. What this tyranny suppresses is the “force” of the modern itself, from which it seeks to preserve the premodern conception of community as a “providential arrangement” of a “superior order” and

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an unquestioning “popular order”—which latter, Arnold writes in his preface to *The Popular Education of France*, may well be “a happier body, as to the eye of the imagination it is certainly a more beautiful body,” “but it is not a democratic people.” Unhappy and unbeautiful, the un-body of democracy is the state—a whole without parts. Without eyes, ears, or heart.

**STATE EDUCATION**

A substantial part of Arnold’s argument for the state is the claim that “to establish elementary schools for the ‘people of the land’ is the State’s duty.” His articulation of that duty in the numerous educational wrangles he entered into yields further evidence of his commitment to advanced tropology as a contribution to the practical necessities of his times.

In 1861, a few months after the Newcastle Commission’s “Report on Elementary Education” appeared, Robert Lowe, liberal vice president of the Committee of Council on Education, sought to introduce a radical revision of the distribution of government grants. Known as the Revised Code, the changes effectively aimed at filtering out the “defiance of the laws of supply and demand” in state aid to national education by introducing a system of “payment by results”: all schoolchildren were to be examined on reading, writing, and arithmetic by state inspectors, and schools would be rewarded in accordance with the performance of their pupils. Duplicitously denying that the Revised Code was designed to cut back government spending on education, one of its proponents, Charles John Vaughan, added a rhetorical question: “who shall complain . . . if henceforth the State should say, ‘What I give, I choose to give as the reward of success; of success in teaching the rudiments?’” In an incisive attack on the Revised Code, Arnold accepts the invitation, relishing the phrase “prizes for success in teaching the rudiments” while he demolishes its logic as a “social and political” as well as, importantly, “administrative blunder.” Even if the Revised Code were not to lead to overall budget reductions, he argues, without conceding the point, the focus on “the rudiments” would inevitably lead to the state’s failure in “other matters . . . really of vital importance to the State—the humanizing of that multitude of children whose home-training is defective, who are very rude, ignorant, or dull, very unlikely to obtain prizes, . . . the forming [of] ‘habits of order, discipline, and neatness,’ the inculcating of ‘elementary truths of religion’”—in short: the state would fail in its responsibility for “civilization.” But even if the Revised Code would not cause this failure, a concession again

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33 Ibid., 7–8.
35 For a fuller account of Arnold’s resistance to this revision, see Cathy Shuman, *Pedagogical Economies: The Examination and the Victorian Literary Man* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 37–48. Our overall emphasis differs from Shuman’s in the sense that we are less concerned with Arnold’s self-interest as Her Majesty’s inspector than with the logic of state representation that is released through his tropes and that resists the representation of self-interest without, evidently, foreclosing it—that is precisely the problem.
37 Ibid., 229–30.
38 Ibid., 230.
41 Ibid., 215 and passim.
ungranted, there would still be the administrative blunder. Turning the tables on the antistatist
defenders of the code, Arnold delivers his most pragmatic blow: the implementation of a system
with state inspectors (Arnold presumably among them) individually examining every pupil on
"the rudiments" to establish his or her eligibility for a prize would double the cost of inspection
in the pre-code dispensation.

The last remaining friends of "voluntary energy and spontaneity" would create a mass of
State-mechanism only to be paralleled in China! Examination, we are told, is now the rule of
our public service. Yes; but where, except in China, is examination the rule not only for
every public servant, but for all those to whom the public servant's action extends? Yet this
is the rule which Mr. Lowe institutes, by examining—not his own inspectors before ap-
pointment—but every child in the schools which these inspectors visit. This is as if the State
undertook, not only to send the exciseman before the Civil Service Commissioners, but to
send before them also all the people who drink beer!42

We labor the point, not just to rescore Arnold's cheap point that things do tend to boil down to
taxes in this connection, but to underscore the accuracy of his state toponology. For the system of
universal individual examination favored by Lowe, by establishing a direct monitorial link be-
tween the state as a figure saying things like "What I give, I choose to give" and the child-citizen
as a supplicant required to demonstrate that he or she deserves this beneficence, is precisely gov-
erned by the parental toponology of community recorded, for instance, in Wordsworth's call for
universal instruction in "the rudiments." Arnold's opposition to this parental pattern is a matter
of principle, and it is important to register the consistency of his postparentalist imagination of
state power with his pragmatic insistence on efficient administration.

The state is "entrusted with stringent powers for the general advantage" (Cé&A, 83): the
citizens, partners in the firm of state, not dependents on Father State, are entitled to trust the
state administration to use these powers adequately. The test of this adequacy is the state's re-
turn of the trust it receives: it must redistribute the power it is entrusted with trustingly, by dele-
gating its responsibilities and by exercising restraint in controlling the end results. The autocratic
state figure imagined by Vaughan fails this test spectacularly, jealously monitoring the use to
which his power is put and double-checking the results in what effectively amounts to a declara-
tion of distrust in the teachers he employs. Payment by results installs a regime of systematic in-
fantilization: the partners in the firm entrust it with power for the general advantage, but what
returns is the power of the parent. What is lost in the process is the idea of the state—as well as a
great deal of money that should have been spent on principled public administration, not prizes
for good pupils.43

Here, too, the debilitating relapse of firm into family is a failure of imagination, an inability
to conceive of power as a tool for improvement that must be released for it to function ade-
quately in systems whose sheer magnitude and complexity defy hands-on government. A similar
failure of imagination informs the confusion of levels of government and administration: the Re-
vised Code, for instance, confuses "imperial" with "municipal functions," thereby losing sight of

42 Ibid., 231.
43 The breach of trust affects the idea of the state and misappropriates the money the citizens contribute for its administration.
On the importance of trust for a proper understanding of the "morality" of the Victorian fiscal state, see Martin Daunton,
“the State’s proper business”; and the English political imagination in general seems unable to distinguish between central and local authority, effectively demonizing all central authority as centralizing—which is to say, local across the board. By contrast, as Arnold writes in Schools and Universities on the Continent, the Prussian state does not show "a grasping and centralising spirit in dealing with education; on the contrary, it makes the administration of it as local as it possibly can; but it takes care that education shall not be left to the chapter of accidents." The point of state intervention in education, as elsewhere, is to render superfluous state interference; the English middle class’s “boasted repudiation of State interference” interferes with this intervention and creates more interference. Its effect, as he argues in another rhetorically impeccable table-turning exercise on parentalist aesthetic ideology, is to sever all vital connexion between the State and popular education, substituting for the idea of a debt and a duty on the State’s part towards this, the idea of a free gift, a gratuitous boon of prizes; for a supervision of the whole movement of popular education,—its method, its spirit, and its tendency,—a mechanical examination of certain scholars in three branches of instruction. For to this must State-inspection inevitably dwindle, when to these the grants of the State are confined. Where the State’s treasure is bestowed, there will its heart be also.

Not that the state should have a heart, let alone, pace Wordsworth, “a mother’s heart,” or is even alive—it remains resolutely an “it,” but it must entertain “vital,” as apparently opposed to “mechanical,” connections to education with the same grammatological justice, or injustice, that allows “organic” to mean “natural” rather than “instrumental,” its original other.

In a late address delivered before the University of Pennsylvania in 1886, Arnold revisits this “vital connection” and specifies a particular instance of it with reference to “the constitution of Canton Zurich, which declares that ‘there shall be an organische Verbindung, an organic connection, between all the schools of the Canton, from the lowest to the highest.’” In America, Arnold urges, the establishment of such a “vivifying relation” would be a great benefit to inter-

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44 Arnold, “Twice-Revised Code,” 230–31. Arnold’s understanding of “municipal organisation” as a prerequisite for a modern country, superseding feudal and ecclesiastical modes of local administration, is usefully documented and contextualized in Malachuk, Perfection, 105–9. The vital point here is that municipal organization should operate in terms of a division of administrative labor with the central offices of the state, which have “imperial” functions. “Imperial,” evidently, is a loaded term, demanding an investigation of the state as the Empire “in its corporate and collective character,” which we cannot undertake here. Arnold’s overdetermined disparagement of Chinese administration in “Twice-Revised Code,” his unwavering Europhilia, and his deep ambivalence about “America” set some of the terms that such an investigation must meet.

45 Arnold, Schools and Universities, 197. In “My Countrymen,” Arnold ironically concedes that this distinction “makes no difference” to the English middle class in its horror of being “meddled with”: “To be sure, I had said that schools ought to be things of local, not State, institution and management . . . but that makes no difference” (C&AFG, 6).

46 A passage from the original Cornhill Magazine that did not make it into Culture and Anarchy instantiates the principle: “a foreign law for education rests on very clear ideas about the citizen’s claim, in this matter, upon the State, and the State’s duty towards the citizen, but has its mechanical details comparatively few and simple, while an English law for the same concern is ruled by no clear ideas about the citizen’s claims and the State’s duty, but has, in compensation, a mass of minute technical details about the number of members on a school-committee, and how many shall be a quorum, and how they shall be summoned, and how often they shall meet” (C&AFG, 527). Arnold found support here, too, in Ludwig Wiese, whose work on Prussian education he had relied on in writing his report on Continental education. In an 1877 review of a new augmented edition of Wiese’s Deutsche Briefe über Englische Erziehung for the Pall Mall Gazette, he notes with relish how “Dr. Wiese continually notices how the absence of all general direction is accompanied, in the case of the English schools, by a bondage in points of detail such as strikes a foreigner with wonder” (“German Letters on English Education,” in Essays, Letters and Reviews, 208). The phrase “boasted repudiation of State interference” is taken from the closing sentence of this review.


mediate and higher but especially to popular education. As a prerequisite for such an “organic connection,” however, “public instruction must be organized as one whole”: “We have not yet so organized it in England, and I do not think that in America you have yet done so either, although in your state governments you have the very machinery best suited for the purpose, a machinery which is lacking at present to us in Great Britain.” While in Britain the proponents of “voluntary energy and spontaneity” lose the plot in the creation of “a mass of State-mechanism only to be paralleled in China,” America is advised to follow the European lead and to deploy its state “machinery” to establish an “organic,” “vivifying” connection.

Next to its evident value as an issue of what Arnold calls “educational opinion,” what interests us in this call for vertical integration in public instruction is the emphatic rhetorical blending of distinct isotopic strands, testifying to Arnold’s sustained efforts to articulate an alternative, nonanthropomorphic imagery of community. This systematic ambivalence in Arnold’s state tropology is perhaps best encapsulated in another of his recurrent definitions of the state as “the organ of the national reason,” a formula that at once activates the customary interpretation of “organ” in terms of the Romantic ideology of natural organicism and its linguistic root meaning of “instrument” or “engine.” Both strands routinely merge with anthropomorphic fantasies representing the state through the figure of the Head of the Family or the Chief Engineer; what remains arresting in Arnold is his sustained eschewal of this particular pathetic fallacy. Far from denying that “‘machinery’ . . . inheres within aesthetic culture as its most intimate condition of possibility,” Arnold consistently professes faith in machinery, as long as machinery does not become an end in itself, as it tends to do, which is when machinery ceases to be machinery, exactly, goes organic, and becomes God, out of the machine.

The state is the “organ of our collective best self” (C&A, 101). Our collective best self is not a compound of our “ordinary selves,” or even of our various “best selves”—our best self is the “general humane spirit,” “the love of human perfection,” which leads us to the precise extent that, as Arnold writes, we are capable of becoming “aliens” (C&A, 110). Far from being a familiar figure facilitating identification, then, the state Arnold attempts to imagine is both the instrument and the product of principled human alienation. That, as an idea, it should be suggested by “culture” is entirely consistent with the function of culture at the present time: “beget[ting] a dissatisfaction which is of the highest possible value in stemming the common tide of men’s thoughts

49 Ibid., 304.
50 Ibid.
52 Redfield, Politics of Aesthetics, 16.
53 The unfamiliarity of Arnold’s nonanthropomorphic state tropology may explain why it is so consistently recast in anthropomorphic terms by his readers. An early instance is the Pall Mall Gazette’s contention, rehearsed by Arnold in an 1865 letter to the editor, that Arnold is “misled by the fallacy—a very common one—that a thing or person called the State probably lives in Downing-street, or its neighbourhood, and is burdened with duties of the utmost importance towards the nation (which is another person living elsewhere)” (Democratic Education, 5). The continuation of the letter is a good illustration of Arnold’s self-conscious mission to craft an alternative “social imaginary,” to use a phrase employed in this context by Lloyd and Thomas (Culture and the State, 125). Unfortunately, Lloyd and Thomas, too, fail to properly register the ambition of Arnold’s rhetoric when they nonchalantly neutralize Arnold’s state into the figure of “the paradigmatic exemplary teacher” (119). Similarly, Regenia Gagnier writes that Arnold “figures his State as an individual whose different capacities had to be harmonized” and adds: “Given that the problem is selfish individualism, it is perhaps ironic that Arnold figures the social body as an individual relying on distinct capacities.” See Regenia Gagnier, “The Law of Progress and the Ironies of Individualism in the Nineteenth Century,” New Literary History 31 (2000): 322. Perhaps it would have been if he had.
in a wealthy and industrial community, and which saves the future, as one may hope, from being vulgarised, even if it cannot save the present” (C&A, 65).

Newman, we recall, on Arnold’s wild hypothesis, “contributed to swell the tide of secret dissatisfaction” that eventually emerged as “the new and more democratic force which is now superseding our old middle-class liberalism” (C&A, 74). This force itself, Arnold adds, “cannot yet be rightly judged,” but the all-too-likely danger is that, rather than maintaining the rule of dissatisfaction, and thus sustaining the “sentiment of Oxford for beauty and sweetness,” “the democracy” will be recuperated by the middle class and its Philistine “faith in machinery” (C&A, 75). The upshot would be the consolidation of vulgarity, the belief that “our greatness and welfare are proved by our being very rich” (C&A, 65), “that the having a vote, like the having a large family, or a large business, or large muscles, has in itself some edifying and perfecting effect upon human nature” (C&A, 75). What “the democracy” needs instead, and is unlikely to get, is “the idea which culture sets before us of perfection,—an increased spiritual activity having for its characters increased sweetness, increased light, increased life, increased sympathy” (C&A, 76). The task of the state, then, is to maintain democratic dissatisfaction. It must prevent the “currents of feeling” it inherited from Newman (“the keen desire for beauty and sweetness,” “the deep aversion . . . to the hardness and vulgarity of middle-class liberalism,” and “the strong light . . . turned on the hideous and grotesque illusions of middle-class Protestantism” [C&A, 74]) from being dammed up by wealth masquerading as welfare and the franchise as a fetish of justice. And it must prevent this “new power,” feeding on the “vast, miserable, unmanageable masses of sunken people . . . created [by] the mere unfettered pursuit of the production of wealth” (C&A, 175), from smashing into anarchy and riots (C&A, 85). The task of the state is to affirm dissatisfaction and alienation, not deny or domesticate them. “But in our political system everybody is comforted” (C&A, 114).

CARE AND CONTROL

Culture is the cultivation of discomfort. It suggests the idea of the state, “controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals” (C&A, 83), “the higher reason of all of them” (C&A, 88). Faced with the dissatisfaction of “the democracy” as it inadequately expresses itself in, say, the 1866 Hyde Park Riots, this entitles the state to the “clear” and “resolute” use of military force (C&A, 85, 100), yet the purpose of this state force is not to maintain the status quo but to safeguard the core of resistance stored in the true sentiment of dissatisfaction: the desire for beauty, sweetness, light, and sympathy.

So far, we have primarily addressed Arnold’s attempts to articulate the state in terms of power and authority. A convenient simplification of our argument is that Arnold consistently rejects anthropomorphic and more particularly parental scripts of state. The figure of the parent feeds fantasies of proximity and control personified in an individual super-agent that are structurally, and often programmatically, insensitive to the complexities of impersonal trust, delegation, and alienation a modern state must maintain. In patriarchal practice, parentalist state tropology tends to favor the name of the father, typically emphasizing control over care, and Arnold’s resistance as we have documented it up to now is mainly a rejection of the father and his various avatars as improper impersonators of state power. Yet as the passage from Wordsworth demonstrates, when the state is imagined in terms of care rather than control, “she own[s] a mother’s heart,” and since this is where “sweetness and light” are ideologically likely (i.e., doomed) to live, it is time we suspend the relative gender neutrality we have observed so far.
Here is a canonical expression of the care-control division in customary state tropology, from one of Arnold’s contemporaries, another “writer” sometimes named as a contributor to the ideology of the welfare state:54

Now, the man’s work for his own home is, as has been said, to secure its maintenance, progress, and defence; the woman’s to secure its order, comfort, and loveliness.

Expand both these functions. The man’s duty, as a member of the commonwealth, is to assist in the maintenance, in the advance, in the defence of the state. The woman’s duty, as a member of the commonwealth, is to assist in the ordering, in the comforting, and in the beautiful adornment of the state.55

In its emphatic concern with what we now call gender, Ruskin’s Sesame and Lilies is eagerly representative of its, and Arnold’s, time. But Arnold stands out among his contemporaries, as is too rarely noted, by an evasion of “the Woman Question” so sustained that it is hard not to think it deliberate, especially given the obvious relevance of gender in educational affairs.56 A brief glance at one of his rare allusions to gender issues may suggest some explanation for his overall reservation.

In “The Twice-Revised Code,” after having comprehensively trashed the proposed reforms as injurious to the state’s educational duty, Arnold concedes that there are a number of points where reform would be desirable; among these, two involve gender:

It can hardly have been by the deliberate judgment of men of sagacity that that meritorious work, Morell’s Analysis of Sentences, was made the intellectual food of girls of sixteen….

It must have been by an accident that those two odious words, male and female (for man and woman, boy and girl), established themselves so firmly in the vocabulary of a department charged with the propagation of humane letters and refinement, from whence they are invading the common language of the whole country, carrying into the relations of social human life the terminology of the Zoological Gardens.57

Arnold’s sophisticated squeamishness in the second point deflects attention away from the intrusion of zoology on pedagogy in his previous, undeveloped point: why “girls” rather than “pupils”? Especially when these pupils elsewhere turn out to be boys. In his inspectorial “General Report for the Year 1961,” as R. H. Super notes, Arnold explained his reservations about Morell’s Analysis of Sentences more fully, arguing that it represents “a stage of doctrine for which the pupil is . . . seldom ripe; he has memory to master the rules of grammar, but seldom understanding to master its metaphysics,” and that to appeal to such understanding is to risk missing “the true aim of a boy’s mental education—to give him the power of doing a thing right.”58

54 Haggard, Persistence, 7.
56 Humboldt’s biographer is similarly puzzled by the absence of a direct engagement with education for girls in Humboldt’s work (Sweet, Humboldt, 2:49). A sustained analysis of gender in Arnold would evidently require careful attention to his poetry, partly on Lionel Trilling’s suggestion that “not all of Arnold’s more explicitly philosophical poetry can give us so clear an insight into his feelings about the cosmos and society as can his poems of sexual love.” See Lionel Trilling, Matthew Arnold, rev. ed. (London: Unwin University Books, 1949), 122.
58 Ibid., 358n. It is evidently no accident that it should be grammar that exercises Arnold here rather than, say, arithmetic, but we cannot pursue Arnold’s specific recommendations on the subject matter of popular education here. For a suggestive opening relevant to this particular point, see Shuman, Pedagogical Economies, 34. See also Shuman’s comments on Arnold and needlework, 53, 67–68.
recommendations, addressed to a limited readership, Arnold argues that education at this level must aim to achieve mastery of the rules, since the pupils, who happen to be boys, are not ripe for the metaphysics and do not need to reason why just yet. But in the contemporaneous article attacking the Revised Code, expressly written for “the general reader,” Morell’s Analysis is considered inappropriate not for boys, not even for pupils, but for “girls of sixteen.” The implication that boys of sixteen would be able to digest Morell is logically noncompelling but rhetorically effective, as is the implication that girls should be served lighter intellectual food. These implications are effective because Arnold offers no alternative justification for the inappropriateness of Morell for girls of sixteen. From his inspectorial report, we know he did have reasons to remove Morell from the curriculum that did not involve gender, so why resort to a distinction whose then emergent labels, incidentally and almost in the same breath, he fears are invading education and the nation? A productive answer to this question, we suggest, is that the sound reasons Arnold had for saving pupils from Morell had already been infected by the zoo-ideological invasion he feared: learning to do a thing right rather than to master its metaphysics is for girls—and boys, in a womanly sort of way, as witness Ruskin’s curriculum recommendations:

I believe . . . that a girl’s education should be nearly, in its course and material of study, the same as a boy’s; but quite differently directed. A woman, in any rank of life, ought to know whatever her husband is likely to know, but to know it in a different way. His command of it should be foundational and progressive; hers general and accomplished for daily and helpful use. Not but that it would often be wiser in men to learn things in a womanly sort of way, for present use, and to seek for the discipline and training of their mental powers in such branches of study as will be afterwards fitted for social service; but, speaking broadly, a man ought to know any language or science he learns, thoroughly—while a woman ought to know the same language, or science, only so far as may enable her to sympathise in her husband’s pleasures, and in those of his best friends.60

Our hypothesis is that Arnold’s tacit switch from “boy” to “girl” in his comments on Morell’s “metaphysics” simultaneously testifies to and seeks to elude the gender ideology Ruskin articulates. The basic thrust of that gender ideology in the field of education, rarely acknowledged as candidly as in Sesame and Lilies, is that the core business of popular instruction in the modern condition is to produce more women. Learning things “in a womanly sort of way” makes us all “fitted for social service”—in Arnold’s terms, it “gives [us] the power of doing a thing right”—and as womanly social service is “to assist in the ordering, in the comforting, and in the beautiful adornment of the state,” “sweetness and light” is deprived of its sting. Conceding in a public polemic that Morell’s metaphysics is too difficult for boys and stands in the way of training them “to do a thing right” would be to admit that popular education really is not only instruction in “the rudiments” but, more worryingly, instruction in a mere mastery of the rules associated with womanly accomplishments. In such an ideological constellation, condemning girls to be girls and therefore unable to digest more demanding intellectual food is a small sacrifice in the service of genuine sweetness and light, which is always critical and intent on the metaphysics of the thing in itself and incommensurable with the loveliness, order, and comfort that comes naturally (i.e., ideologically) to girls.

60 Ruskin, Sesame, 105.
The easiest way to ward off charges of womanliness branding an entire discursive apparatus with inferior superficiality is to relegate women to an inferior region of that regime. Arnold, to his credit, rarely resorts to this ruse, but even though the Morell moment is an exception, and an implicit one at that, it does testify to a more general unease about gender regimentation. For just like the Revised Code’s perversion of “duty” into “free gift” subjects the state to the inadequate rule of paternalist tropology, so the deflection of “sweetness and light” into what Ruskin imagines as the “ordering,” “comforting,” and “beautiful adornment of the state” produced in “womanly” “social service” domesticates the state’s ambitious care for “perfection,” effectively remodeling it on the routines of the perfect housewife. And to the extent that perfection is the province of culture, culture itself becomes a womanly sort of care. Arnold’s remarkable silence on gender in general and “female” education in particular, no matter how accidental or deliberate it may have been, acts as a cordon sanitaire against the wholesale feminization of “culture,” thereby reinforcing his rhetorical determination not to imagine the state along the partializing lines of the family, in which, trivially and therefore crucially, the gender-power nexus is most visibly encoded. But culture, always already susceptible to systematic sissification in its commitment to sweetness and light, can hardly avoid infection, and passing on that infection to its idea. The state Arnold envisaged is suggested by culture as an engine of alienation and discomfort securing the public administration of human dissatisfaction engendered by the desire for radical (i.e., postcomfortable) sweetness and light. Ruskin, by contrast, obeys the dynamics of gendering Arnold seeks to elude and blithely embraces parental tropology by imagining the state as the family home of the nation.

In retrospect, it seems fair to say that Ruskin’s image is the more adequate expression of the actual fate of the modern Western state—with the qualification that the harmonious marriage of Ruskin’s “Kings” and “Queens” has found its modern truth in the tired quarreling of the Nanny and the Night Watchman—plenty of bad feeling, but little of it fed by the alienating and undivided dissatisfaction Arnold considered it the state’s duty to maintain. The Night Watchman jealously preserves what Arnold darkly diagnosed as “the religion of inequality,” while the Nanny’s all too visible hand demands and delivers measures of welfare to sugar the opium—a sorry surrogate for sweetness and light setting “too low and material a standard of well-being.”

61 Another rare acknowledgment of the issue in Arnold’s educational writing occurs in a footnote to Schools and Universities on the Continent, where Arnold admits that he has not found the time to properly inspect girls’ schools but adds that “the girls’ schools well merit a separate enquiry, and by an enquirer who has first thoroughly acquainted himself, as I have not, with the working of our girls’ schools at home.” He continues, intriguingly, that “Italian girls seem to me those in all Europe who are best suited for school education as distinguished from home education; who derive most benefit from it, and with the fewest drawbacks of any kind. On the other hand, I doubt whether there is any German or English girl for whom there are not grave drawbacks to balance its benefits” (281).

62 On the relation between the nation and the family, which retains this gender coding, see Redfield, Politics of Aesthetics, 54–59. The feminization of intellectual labor in Victorian culture is detailed in James Eli Adams, Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinities (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). As noted above, Arnold’s Morell moment, implicitly recovering a measure of masculinity from the opprobrium of the “womanly,” is an exception, and it is worth underscoring that he generally avoids the reactive strategies of remasculinization that Adams detects in the work of his fellow intellectual laborers. A passage from Adams’s introduction helps to highlight the relevance of this point: “The middle-class male authors I analyze—Carlyle, Tennyson, Thomas Arnold, Newman, Dickens, Kingsley, Pater, and Wilde—depict their own intellectual labors in markedly varied rhetorics, but those rhetorics are persistently related in their appeal to a small number of models of masculine identity: the gentleman, the prophet, the dandy, the priest, and the soldier” (2). The point is in the name of the father.

63 This last phrase is Arnold’s verdict on the “fatal defect” of “socialistic and communistic [sic] schemes” in his 1878 essay “Equality,” which examines the English “religion of inequality” (C&e, 224).
the state to displace are only ever reinforced: class continues to function as the default criterion for the citizen’s access to control, while gender is confirmed as a dominant marker for participation in increasingly controlled practices of care.64 None of this is new now: it is what “the new and more democratic force” (C&A, 74) Arnold monitored in the 1860s delivered, not the truly new state he tried to name.

**THE SEX OF THE ALIENS**

Nothing could be easier than to dismiss Arnold’s insistence on a radically different imagination of the state as merely a symptom of the predictable half-baked idealism of bourgeois liberalism seeking to belittle the demands of distributive justice imperfectly met, though met nonetheless, through the offices of the welfare state.65 Unless it be to dismiss it as merely a symptom of the predictable half-baked idealism of an effeminate aesthete out of touch with the practical realities of running a wealthy and industrial country.

After the publication of the first installment of what was to become *Culture and Anarchy*, the *Illustrated London News* singled out for censure Arnold’s “really effeminate horror of simple, practical, common-sense reforms aimed at the removal of some particular abuse, and rigidly restricted to that object.”66 In his final installment proper, Arnold rises to the challenge and considers one such “simple reform,” the Real Estate Intestacy Bill, with a view to testing whether his “effeminate horror” would survive (C&A, 160). Unsurprisingly, it does, leaving us with Arnold’s advance supposition that in that case, “it must have . . . some reason or other to support it, and can hardly merit the stigma of its present name” (C&A, 160). That reason, equally unsurprisingly, is reason itself.

The proposed bill only arranges for the equal distribution of a man’s property among his children in the case of his intestate death, thereby singularly failing to address the real issue, which is the relation between property and welfare, both for the individual and for the community, quite apart from any man’s individual will (C&A, 162). Reason tells us that in the “luxurious, settled and easy society” of postfeudal modernity, the near-exclusive possession of wealth by a tiny minority is detrimental to their own welfare and to that of the entire community (C&A, 163). Reason, in shorthand Arnold does not write, dictates that the modern condition demands distributive justice. Such shorthand is unlikely to convince the aristocracy, and Arnold stays with his habitual elegant longhand, sticking to “sweetness and light” in the hope of making the “feudal class quietly and gradually drop its feudal habits because it sees them at variance with truth and reason” (C&A, 165).67

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64 On the gender of voluntary pre-welfare work in the West relevant to this point, see Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, eds., *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

65 This would be the typical “left-liberal” understanding of Arnold that Malachuk finds represented in Edward Said (*Perfection*, 57).


67 The measure of agency in this wishful performance may seem weak and defensive, and ultimately self-serving, as Thomas suggests (*Cultivating Victorians*, 39), but only from a position that has already decided that discursive work can never count as “determined action” — a position Thomas emphatically does not take but at times, as in his comments on Arnold, seems drawn to nonetheless, thereby curiously withholding from Arnold the suspension of suspicion he advocates for other, perhaps more manly Victorians.
Once the resistance to practical reforms is justified by reason in the name of the state, the stigma of effeminacy is lifted, revealing not quite muscular manliness but something more reminiscent of the honorific Arnold bestowed on his exemplary champion of reasoned reform: “one of the most beautiful souls that have ever existed” (C&A, 123–24). If any ever have, for what is a beautiful soul? And what of the stigma attached to its name?68 One canonical contribution to its definition is Schiller’s, in the article “Über Anmuth und Würde” (On Grace and Dignity) published in his own journal Neue Thalia in 1793: “One refers to a beautiful soul when the ethical sense has at last so taken control of all a person’s feelings that it can leave affect to guide the will without hesitation and is never in danger of standing in contradiction of its decisions.”69 When morality can trust affective inclination, high reason and right feeling are achieved and projected in the figure of the beautiful soul, “that harmony that seals perfected humanity.” Prior to such perfection (i.e., in the present time), the beautiful soul exists only as its own prefiguration, necessarily subject to the imperfect time of representation.

In another piece on “das Ideal der Menschheit” (the ideal of humanity) that appeared in Neue Thalia around the same time, under the telling title “What Can Be the Extent of the State’s Care for Its Citizens?” Arnold’s favorite beautiful soul self-consciously sexes the imperfect representation of achieved humanity: “If it is not somewhat fanciful to suppose that each human excellence represents and accumulates itself, as it were, in some one species of being, we might believe that the whole treasure of morality and order is collected and enshrined in the female character.”70 Everything depends on what “represents and accumulates” and “collected and enshrined” (Joseph Coulthard’s suggestively circumlocutory double-barreled translations of Humboldt’s darstellt and bewahrt) may be made to mean: passively preserving the treasure of morality in its purity by not spending it on imperfect actions, or actively re-presenting it, releasing it to make it real. For Humboldt, women, like Schiller’s schöne Seele (“[It] has no other merit besides being”),71 and he unsurprisingly settles the matter by pairing woman off in marriage, leaving all initiative to the man, and preserving ideal unsplit humanity for a future fiction not to be meddled with by the state.72

For Hegel, to recall another canonical encoding of the beautiful soul, a being that does not act does not actually exist and, by implication, has no place in the state.

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71 “Wholly exempt as she is from most outward-occupations, and almost surrounded with those only which leave the soul undisturbed—stronger in what she can be than in what she can do—more full of expression in her calm and quiet, than in her manifested sensations—more richly endowed with all means of immediate, indefinable expression” (Humboldt, Sphere and Duties of Government, chap. 3).

72 In view of Humboldt’s explicit recommendation that the state “should entirely withdraw its active solicitude from the institution of Matrimony” (ibid.), and bearing in mind the powerful hold of the marriage trope on the Victorian imagination, Arnold’s riffs on the Deceased Wife’s Sister Bill (C&A, 165–68) deserve close scrutiny here.
It lacks force to externalize itself, the power to make itself a thing, and endure existence. It lives in dread of staining the radiance of its inner being by action and existence. And to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with actuality, and steadfastly perseveres in a state of self-willed impotence to renounce a self which is pared away to the last point of abstraction, and to give itself substantial existence, or, in other words, to transform its thought into being, and commit itself to absolute distinction [that between thought and being]. The hollow object, which it produces, now fills it, therefore, with the feeling of emptiness. Its activity consists in yearning, which merely loses itself in becoming an unsubstantial shadowy object, and, rising above this loss and falling back on itself, finds itself merely as lost. In this transparent purity of its moments it becomes a sorrow-laden “beautiful soul,” as it is called; its light dims and dies within it, and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air.73

However it is valorized, then, the so-called beautiful soul seems destined to remain alien to the state, either transcending it in the wishful futurity of final fiction imperfectly prefigured in a fantasized feminine self or failing to rise to the requirement of real self-renunciation, stuck in the hopeless impotence of things of the past. In sharp contrast, Arnold’s beautiful soul, perversely, claims citizenship of the state at the present time as an ungendered alien self, while stubbornly preserving its resistance to simple, practical, limited reforms. Yet precisely by performing this resistance in the name of the state, reclaimed from both Humboldt’s curse (by rewriting it) and Hegel’s blessing (by ignoring it), its alienated writing turns “fitted for social service” and underwrites the impure, historical (limited, indirect, unintentional) actualization of its “sentiment . . . for beauty and sweetness” (C&A, 74) in the simple, practical, limited, womanly sort of form of the welfare state. Now that the demise of the welfare state seems pretty much assumed by most of the Arnolds of our time,74 it is tempting to think we know all he can teach us. But we are still obliged to actually read him writing up unscripted feelings for a state fit for aliens that is yet to come.  

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