The End of Ideology (Critique)?

I.  

In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Slavoj Žižek famously lays out his analysis of claims that we* find ourselves in a postideological age. Žižek doesn't exactly mean "postideological" in the sense of Daniel Bell or Francis Fukuyama. For Bell or Fukuyama, postideology is characterized by the rise of technocracy, the transformation of great political debates into parochial, microideological questions, what tax rate to set, how to regulate this or that industry, what zoning ordinances to pass in a city. For Žižek, by contrast, postideology refers to the failure or collapse of ideology critique as such. 

We used to think that by exposing frauds, lies, and the subtle ideological lacework of high cultural artefacts, we liberated ourselves from self-deception and false consciousness. Now, Žižek admits, everyone practices ideology critique. We have achieved a reflexive cynicism, what Peter Sloterdijk calls "cynical reason." Recounting Sloterdijk's argument in Critique of Cynical Reason, Žižek writes: "Cynicism is the answer of the ruling culture to this kynical subversion: it recognizes, it takes into account... the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but it still finds reason to retain the mask." Under such conditions, "the traditional critique of ideology no longer works. We can no longer subject the ideological text to 'symptomatic reading', confronting it with its blank spots, with what it must repress to organize itself, to preserve its consistency--cynical reason takes this distance into account in advance."

In this post, I'd like to question whether traditional ideology critique is as obsolete as Žižek suggests, and eventually question the efficacy of his endrun around its alleged collapse. I haven't arrived at strong conclusions yet, but I'd love to get a conversation started in the comments section that might help me figure out whether or not Žižek is right.

II.

The Space Merchants, a small masterpiece of science fictional satire, will serve as my model of traditional ideology critique.

Fredrick Pohl and C.M. Kornbluth’s 1952 novel depicts a dystopian future in which the free market has colonized all governmental functions and public space. The House of Representatives and Senate represent not American states but corporate firms, in proportion to those firms’ financial might. The social world is divided between two great classes: immiserated consumers (the overwhelming majority of the population, many of whom rent individual stairs in skyscrapers to sleep upon every night) and wealthy executives (a tiny but powerful minority who enjoy slightly more space in tiny studio apartments).

Government-engineered overpopulation (meant to increase the consumer base) threatens to consume all of Planet Earth’s resources, inspiring the rise of the "Consies," radical conservationists who engage in sabotague and other acts of dissent against the monolithic consumerist order of the day. Let it not be said that Pohl and Kornbluth's satire is subtle.  Nonetheless, it dates surprisingly well for Golden Age science fiction. The novel's plot hinges on an effort by the "Star Class" copysmith, Mitch Courtney of Fowler Schocken Associates, to successfully sell American consumers on the prospect of colonizing Venus, which is by all accounts a hellhole--scalding hot, wracked by 500 mph winds, chemically toxic to biological life--more or less uninhabitable. The novel is thus not only about the social dynamics of its dystopian world, but a commentary on the contemporary function and dangers of advertising, a popular topic at the time (and ever since). 

There is much one can say about the novel but for the purposes of this post, I'd like to present one especially interesting scene. Early in the novel, Mitch is trying to convince Jack O’Shea, the first man to land on Venus and return to Earth alive, that marketers can indeed shape consumer preferences using only language, that in fact O'Shea's various consumer choices have been successfully, subconsciously manipulated by Fowler Schocken Associates.

O’Shea laughed uncertainly. “And you did it with words?”

“Words and pictures. Sights and sound and smell and taste and touch. And the greatest of these is words. Do you read poetry?”

“My God, of course not! Who can?”

“I don’t mean the contemporary stuff; you’re quite right about that. I mean Keats, Swinburne, Wylie—the great lyricists.”

“I used to,” he cautiously admitted. “What about it?”

“I’m going to ask you to spend the morning and afternoon with one of the world’s great lyric poets: A girl named Tildy Mathis. She doesn’t know that she’s a poet; she thinks she’s a boss copywriter. Don’t enlighten her. It might make her unhappy.

‘Thou still unravish’d bride of quietness,

Thou Foster-child of Silence and slow Time—’

That’s the sort of thing she would have written before the rise of advertising. The correlation is perfectly clear. Advertising up, lyric poetry down. There are only so many people capable of putting together words that stir and move and sing. When it became possible to earn a very good living in advertising by exercising this capability, lyric poetry was left to untalented screwballs who had to shriek for attention and compete by eccentricity.”

“Why are you telling me all this?” he asked.

“I said you’re on the inside, Jack. There’s a responsibility that goes with power. Here in this profession we reach into the souls of men and women. We do it by taking talent and redirecting it. Nobody should play with lives the way we do unless he’s motivated by the highest ideals."

O’Shea reassures Mitch not worry, that his motives in promoting the colonization of a nearly uninhabitable planet are pure. “I’m not in this thing for money or fame," he says. "I’m in it so the human race can have some elbow room and dignity again.” Mitch is shocked at this answer and informs the reader that “[t]he ‘highest ideal’ I had been about to cite was Sales.”

What may not be obvious, and what it took me a while to wrap my head around, is that Mitch is not -- and at no time in the novel can ever be accused of being--a cynic. Mitch is a true believer in the sacrament of Sales. He believes in the virtue of the current order--and sees nothing deceptive or self-interested in his pursuit of what he regards as the "highest ideal." His uprightness and inability to see the horror before his eyes is, of course, partly what makes The Space Merchants so funny.

When, later in the novel, he comes to understand the ideological flaws in his worldview, he begins acting differently, ultimately bringing theory and action into alignment. Score one for traditional ideology critique! 

III. 

Have things changed much since The Space Merchants was published? I'd suggest the answer is no.

A similar non-cynical commitment can be seen in the recent vogue for "neuromarketing" and "neurocinema," a practice that involves using fMRI scans to understand more fully how we process visual and auditory stimuli while watching advertisements and films. Firms with such imaginative names as MindSign Neuromarketing, Neuro-Insight, NeuroFocus, and the Social Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory at Caltech are leading the effort to figure out what our brains "really" think as we watch film.

Explaining the goals of neurocinema, Peter Katz says:

Movies could easily become more effective at fulfilling the expectations of their particular genre. Theatrical directors can go far beyond the current limitations of market research to gain access into their audience’s subconscious mind. The filmmakers will be able to track precisely which sequences/scenes excite, emotionally engage or lose the viewer’s interest based on what regions of the brain are activated. From that info a director can edit, re-shoot an actor’s bad performance, adjust a score, pump up visual effects and apply any other changes to improve or replace the least compelling scenes. Studios will create trailers that will [be] more effective at winning over their intended demographic. Marketing executives will know in a TV spot whether or not to push the romance- or action-genre angle because, for example, a scene featuring the leads kissing at a coffee shop could subconsciously engage the focus group more than a scene featuring a helicopter exploding.

Their ultimate goal, of course, is to create aesthetic experiences that are utterly engrossing and irrisistable, all in the holy name of Sales, which--naturally!--only occur by supplying the autonomous consumer with What He Demands, even if this consumer doesn't know what he is really Demanding. This is a version of what the film cartridge "Infinite Jest" does in David Foster Wallace's magnum opus. But what is interesting to me about neuromarketing/-cinema is the degree to which our "subconscious" responses to stimuli are regarded as our "authentic" responses. The problem researchers seem to face is that consumers don't remember films well enough to fill out surveys or that when they fill out such surveys consumers feel obligated to respond positively. Social norms and lapses in consciousness get in the way of arriving at the truth.

In short, neuromarketers/-cineasts position what they are doing as giving The People what They Really Want. What could be more non-cynical than that? And yet, the question remains: would a humanistic debunking of the idea that fMRI scans are such "authentic" or "real" representations of desire do much to derail the train of neurocinema? If not, what sort of ideology critique could?

IV. 

Attempting to expose the reign of cynical reason, Žižek's develops an idea of "ideological fantasy," the notion that cynical subjects "do not know... that their social reality itself, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic inversion. What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know very well how things really are, but they are doing it as if they do not know. The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy."

He concludes that to the degree our ideology is encoded not in our ideas but in our collective, unconscious fantasies, "we are of course far from being a post-ideological society. Cynical distance is just one way--one of many ways--to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them." I am skeptical that the transfer of ideology from ideas to fantasies solves the problem, for a variety of reasons.

Isn't the critique of ideological fantasies very much in line with traditional ideology critique, simply transferred to a new object? Don't the examples of The Space Merchants and neurocinema suggest that the fundamental problem is the content of ideology, not its form? Given these examples, isn't a little bit of cynicism just what we need?

 ---

* Please feel free to engage in ideology critique of my use of the term "we" in the comments section below. Or have I preempted your† ideology critique by anticipating it here in this footnote, in effect sucking you into an unconscious ideological fantasy? Don't look at me for answers! I have no idea.

† I give up. 

Andrew Goldstone's picture

I've got to read The Space Merchants; your framing of it as ideology critique is very enticing. Sci-fi (or the fantastic mode) may be particularly congenial for satire of this kind. I'm fond of the 1905 story "Sultana's Dream" by Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, which critiques purdah by imagining a solar-powered techno-utopia entirely designed and ruled by women (men, due to their violent tendencies, are kept in confinement).

Your précis of Žižek makes him sound pretty inconsequential. Why do you think you need to refute his difficult-to-decipher claim about our supposed postideological era? We can certainly ask questions about the practical efficacy of a critique of (in particular) free-market capitalist ideology, or questions about how it connects to other kinds of resistance or reform or revolution; but do we need to worry about whether the critique itself is no longer valid?

Idle question 1: "Keats, Swinburne, Wylie"? Elinor Wylie, I assume. Can we talk about this literary canon?

Idle question 2: Pohl and Kornbluth's collaborative authorship: thoughts?

Natalia Cecire's picture

"Sultana's Dream" sounds amazing; must read it.

Lee Konstantinou's picture

(1) My own view is no doubt showing in my précis -- which is to say that I agree with you. I address his argument only because it is a particularly well-known example of a certain move I've noticed in critiques of cynicism/irony. The critique goes something like this: cynicism/irony used to be a great way of subverting The System, but now The System has built cynicism/irony into Itself. I think there is a common assumption or reflexive argument that ideology critique is, in and of itself, a worthy goal, though this assumption/argument often smuggles in a presumed set of problematic aspects of The System deserving of critique.

(2) I initially considered writing about the canon and began typing a few words about the Keats excerpt, but I soon felt overwhelmed with confusion and excitement. Which is to say: I don't know what to say about the canon, except that (I should mention) O'Shea is extremely short, since he had to fit in the pod that took him to Venus, which perhaps accounts for Keats's and Swinburne's presence, though I am not sure about Wylie's height. Beyond that, and more seriously, I think there is a not so latent anti-modernism in the canon, especially in the snide comments about the "untalented screwballs" writing contemporary poetry. What do you make of the canon?

(3) Collaboration: a very interesting question. I don't know enough about the historical conditions of the novel's composition to say what it means, except that Pohl and Kornbluth were both part of the Futurians, and Golden Age science fiction very much arose from communities of writer/editors who were also fans. The specificity of the social matrix they came out of may also account for their peculiar poetry canon, but I don't know enough to say for sure.

Andrew Goldstone's picture

Personally I believe there can be no end to the usefulness of cynicism, but some cynicisms are more useful than others.

Keats, Swinburne, Wylie: what tickled me was the way the British poets set up a classic aestheticist lineage, but the punchline is not American high modernism. Pohl and Kornbluth's anti-modernism reminds me of Lovecraft's hatred for TS Eliot, which I learned about from Leif Sorensen's essay  A Weird Modernist Archive: Pulp Fiction, Pseudobiblia, H.P. Lovecraft. Lovecraft apparently wrote a parody called The Waste Paper. I suppose this attitude comes mostly from resentment at the celebrity and stature of "untalented screwballs" on the part of authors stuck down in the pulp stratum of literature; on the other hand it's sort of surprising to find that nostalgic defense of purist lyricism in the unlyrical, impure, and self-consciously innovative genres of scifi and weird fiction.

I like the idea of the space-pod test for literary value.

How are you getting to an anti-modernism on the part of Pohl and Kornbluth from a three-person list a character in an imagined dystopia gives?

Is it not rather the case (to engage in a typically Zizekian rhetorical move) that by giving that list as they did, Pohl and Kornbluth were expressing their arch modernism via negativa?

I think that the 1952 date is relevant, as a moment post-modernism that was not quite self-consciously postmodernist (or postideologist). This may lead to the later consensus perception that modernism marks a moment at which cynicism *starts* becoming co-opted by the System, and thus a way out of the impasse/vicious circle of impossible critique has to return to something romantic or pre-modernist. Taking this further: like you, Lee (I think), I have been intrigued to note that the most scientifically advanced explorations of what we "really" think often seem to return to a trust in some inner self (now recast as a biological substrate).

Lee Konstantinou's picture

Yes, I think the historical moment matters, especially as an answer to Ben's question. My speculation that the -- admittedly short -- list of poets reflects a kind of anti-modernism is less about the specific authors named, though their formalism and "lyricism" matters, than the condemnation of "untalented screwballs," whom (I am presuming, in Mitch's as a well as Pohl and Kornbluth's view) are accruing unwarrented praise and prestige from the official organs of high culture. If in 1952 this doesn't refer to modernism -- or a version of the avant-garde -- who then? I wouldn't completely stand behind that argument without more research to back it up, but it seems plausible to me.

Another hint is that Pohl and Kornbluth do not, as far as I can tell, dispute Mitch's claim that there are a limited number of genuinely talented poets and that these poets would be absorbed by advertising. Indeed, in the world of the novel, advertising works as advertised...

Regarding neurocinema, I am intersted in a similar dynamic. I am willing to take it for granted that, in some sense, neurocinema works, but I agree, Siobhan, that a recourse to Biology as Authenticity is the interesting question. This may call for another blog post to tease out a bit more.

It doesn't seem to be another hint, insofar as the question of whether any antimodernism attributable to Mitch is also attributable to Pohl and Kornbluth isn't answered by demonstrating that antimodernism is attributable to Mitch. One could even think they endorse Mitch's apparent belief that there is a limited number of people who would be genuinely talented producers of lyric poetry in a Keatsian mode and that they would be absorbed by advertising while simultaneously thinking that that sort of poetizing isn't appropriate any longer in the modern world so (perhaps even) all to the good that these versifiers are off doing other things anyway.

But one needn't get into that, because it seems to me that if Pohl and Kornbluth don't explicitly dispute Mitch's claim, that doesn't help establish that they agree with any part of it, since their giving Mitch those beliefs could very well be part and parcel of the unsubtlety of the satire: this true believer in the power of sales also harbors decidedly retrograde beliefs about poetry! Well, what else would you expect—in our own world, wouldn't a Mitch-like person likely find lyric poetry with rhymes and whatnot to his taste, but be skeptical about this new stuff?

Lee Konstantinou's picture

... could be right; I would need to dig into the historical record to decide between the interpretations with more confidence. I've been meaning to read Pohl's memoir, The Way the Future Was, for a while now, and to learn more about the social scene around the Futurians.

Then again, there's already lots of internal evidence to suggest that when Mitch says he knows how to sell things to consumers he's not joking or confused or self-deceived. And his powers of persuasion seem very much linked to the accuracy of his claim that his copywriters are indeed great lyricists. So if you're right, Mitch would have to be basically correct that his copywriters are great lyricists, perhaps even correct that there is a finite number of great lyricists in a given population, but also suffer from what Pohl and Kornbluth view as bad taste/retrograde views when it comes to non-lyrical contemporary art.

Again, this is possible, but this interpretation strikes me as less plausible. 

One of the 'now' bizarre claims in Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction:

Anything can be literature, and anything which is regarded as unalterably and unquestionably literature -- Shakespeare for example -- can cease to be literature.

...the so-called 'literary canon', the unquestioned 'great tradition' of the 'national literature', has to be recognized as a construct, fashioned by particular people for particular reasons at a certain time. There is no such thing as a literary work or tradition which is valuable in itself, regardless of what anyone might have said or come to say about it. 'Value' is a transitive term: it means whatever is valued by certain people in specific situations, according to particular criteria and in the light of given purposes. It is thus quite possible that, given a deep enough transformation of our history, we may in the future produce a society which is unable to get anything at all out of Shakespeare. His works might simply seem desperately alien, full of styles of thought and feeling which such a society found limited or irrelevant. In such a situation, Shakespeare would be no more valuable than much present-day graffiti. (11-12)

It's hard to believe that I once almost agreed with Eagleton on this point.
One parallel to Rorty's formulation, "Ayer's victory over Whitehead," might be: "from Kaufmann's Shakespeare (which was for free spirits) to Greenblatt's (which is for yuppies)." Isn't Greenblatt's Shakespeare close to Shakespeare that ceases to be literature, in that, in his presentation, there's really not much "news that stays news" in or about Shakespeare?

Ideology critique as it is practiced (explicitly or implictly) by Eagleton or by Greenblatt seems to kill whatever "news that stays news" in the works they deal with. Maybe there's a caveat for critics. And yet, countering them must proceed by way of ideology critique as well. So, if only to that end, ideology critique should be kept well and alive.

*I've been thinking (and wanting to think) about issues you raise in your post and some others that are related to them. It's hard to sort them through!

William Flesch's picture

Shakespeare for yuppies: nice.  What I would say is that Eagleton is certainly right in theory, but not in practice.  That is, it's an impossible practice because the very act of valuing contains as one of its modes the act of ascribing transcendent value.  And I can know (or suspect) in theory that there is no transcendent value.  But I still go on ascribing it, at a level that my theory can't reach.  So affecting a belief that value is contingent is, well, affectation.  I might know it, but when I'm valuing ("in a real case" --LW), I don't believe it.

This is one of the antinomies of aesthetic judgment in Kant: I know all judgments (including my own) are subjective but I believe that my judgments are universal (and should be held by all others). 

Yes. May I also say Eagleton falls into excesses of "subjective reason"? (Are they the same thing?) Right after the passage I cited above he says:

And although many people would consider such a social condition tragically impoverished, it seems to me dogmatic not to entertain the possibility that it might arise rather from a general human enrichment. Karl Marx was troubled by the question of why ancient Greek art retained an 'eternal charm', even though the social conditions which produced it had long passed; but how do we know that it will remain 'eternally' charming, since history has not yet ended? Let us imagine that by dint of some deft archaelogical research we discovered a great deal more about what ancient Greek tragedy actually meant to its original audiences, recognized that these concerns were utterly remote from our own, and began to read the plays again in the light of this deepened knowledge. One result might be that we stopped enjoying them.

Eagleton in these moments (and there are many of them, unfortunately) recalls what Adorno said about generational rivalry: "...in an antagonistic society the relation between generations too is one of competition, behind which stands naked power. But today it is beginning to regress to a state versed, not in the Oedipus complex, but in parricide." "One realized with horror that earlier, opposing one's parents because they represented the world, one was often secretly the mouthpiece, against a bad world, of one even worse" (Minima Moralia 22).

Maybe outright parricide/patricide is more exciting (and practical) than the Oedipus complex, and any kind of activism for a better world shouldn't forget that social relations are based on competition/naked power. But that's one thing, and it's another thing to become a "mouthpiece, against a bad world, of one even worse."

*Shakespeare may cease to be literature and Greek art may stop being charming. They may do so in a society that achieves "general human enrichment." Even so, such a society would value (preserve and remember) the traditions of Shakespeare readership through the centuries (even if it is now obsolete), or the ideas surrounding "literature" and "art" (why it was once deemed necessary to study them, etc.). Then it would be impossible to not get anything out of Shakespeare or Greek art. They would matter somehow.

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